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Clio on the Stand: The Promise and Perils of
Historical Review
PETER IRONS*
The Constitutional Bicentennial has provided the legal and his-
torical professions with one of those periodic, and largely fortui-
tous, times of confluence that give rise to discussion and debate
about the relations of each profession to the other, and the rela-
tion of both to the continuing need to educate the larger public in
the lessons of law and history. This past year of 1987 in particu-
lar, in which televised celebrations of the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787 were followed by televised hearings on the nomina-
tion of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, brought
conflicting visions of the judicial function before the public. Law
and history came together during this year, and lawyers and his-
torians came together at gatherings such as this Bicentennial Con-
stitutional and Legal History Symposium. Because the practition-
ers of each profession so rarely meet in public, only good can
come from meetings like this.
My own contribution to this symposium is based on two aspects
of my professional work: first, that I have been trained in both
history and law; second, that I have practiced both professions in
relation to an important episode in American legal history, the
mass evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II. As we all know, the Supreme Court upheld in
1943 and 1944 the constitutionality of the military curfew and
exclusion orders that paved the legal roads to the concentration
camps into which more than 120,000 Americans of Japanese an-
cestry had been herded in 1942.' More recently, federal district
and appellate judges have vacated the original criminal convic-
tions in these wartime cases, basing their decisions on evidence of
governmental misconduct during the original proceedings that was
uncovered in recent years by historical researchers, of whom I was
one.' Since I participated in these reopened cases as a lawyer for
* Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, and Raoul Wal-
lenberg Distinguished Visiting Professor of Human Rights, Rutgers University. Ph.D., Bos-
ton University, J.D., Harvard Law School.
I. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320
U.S. 115 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986); 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). The
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the Japanese Americans who sought review of their convictions,
and testified in one as a historian, I have a somewhat unique per-
spective from which to view the relations of law and history in
these cases. Using this episode as a case study, I propose to ad-
dress the role of historians in an adversary system.
Two other recent cases, involving challenges to school prayer
and charges of sex discrimination in employment, provide alterna-
tive models of the presentation of historical data in trial courts
and disparate outcomes of these efforts. The question of whether
historians have a proper or useful role in court is not the same
question, I should note, as the use and abuse of historical "evi-
dence" by judges, particularly by the justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Nor does it relate directly to the continuing controversy
over "historians' law" as opposed to "lawyers' history." Each of
these questions has generated much heat and a dim glimmer of
light in the debates of the past generation. These distinct issues
deserve a brief review as they relate to the role of historians in an
adversary system.
I. HISTORIANS' LAW AND LAWYERS' HISTORY
Historians have generally been the aggressors in conflicts with
lawyers and judges, accusing their adversaries of twisting and dis-
torting history for partisan ends. In the book, The Supreme Court
and the Uses of History, Charles A. Miller placed the Court on
trial and convicted it of historical assault and battery in five im-
portant constitutional cases, including the Minnesota mortgage
moratorium case of the 1930s and the legislative reapportionment
cases of the 1960s. Miller lamented that, although lawyers can
lose poorly prepared and argued cases, judges "win them all" and
can commit "historical fabrication" with impunity. 3 Other histo-
rian have denounced "law office history" and have urged their col-
leagues to "reclaim" the writing of legal history from lawyers.4 It
seems significant that the authors of these indictments generally
reflect a conservative, or revisionist, animus toward the jurispru-
dence of the Warren Court. Historian Alfred Kelly, in his attack
on the Warren Court's use of history to bolster its decisions, made
clear his distaste for the "libertarian idealism" that animated
these decisions.5 My assumption is that conservative historians,
Yasui decision of Judge Belloni in federal district court in Oregon is unreported.
3. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
4. Murphy, Time to Reclaim; The Current Challenge of American Constitutional
History, 69 AM. HIsT. REv. 64 (1963); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,
1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119.
5. Kelly, supra note 4, at 157.
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who venerate the icon of "objectivity," can easily discern flaws in
the opinions of justices who cannot root their decisions in the shal-
low soil of precedent and who turn instead to the deep humus of
historical evidence.
Although my present concern lies in the use of historical evi-
dence in trial courts, I should note the reliance by the Supreme
Court on such evidence in three cases, perhaps the most important
decisions of the past half-century. In Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, the Court not only took a close look at the Congressional
debates that led to adoption and ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, but it invited the submission of historical briefs on
the intent of those who drafted and debated the amendment and
listened to reargument on this question.6 The justices concluded
that, "although these sources cast some light" on the intent of the
drafters in regard to school segregation, "it is not enough to re-
solve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are in-
conclusive."' Although this exercise in "intent history" did not
provide a definitive answer to the Court's question, similar inquir-
ies have been conducted in many cases. The "jurisprudence of
original intent" that Attorney General Edwin Meese III has pro-
claimed as the Court's primary function, if adopted by the jus-
tices, would make "intent history" a flourishing industry.
The Supreme Court plunged into the "political thicket" of reap-
portionment in 1962, holding in Baker v. Carr that judicial review
was not barred by the "political question" doctrine. Writing for
the majority, Justice William J. Brennan undertook to "analyze
representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads
that make up the political question doctrine."8 Brennan pored over
dozens of prior decisions in his opinion, finding that "none of those
threads catches this case." 9 Dissenting in his acerbic fashion, Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter accused the majority of casting aside the
"uniform course of our political history" regarding the apportion-
ment issue.10 Jousting with "precedential history" as weapons,
Brennan and Frankfurter used the Court's own decisions as histor-
ical ammunition.
Perhaps the most controversial judicial use of history came in
Roe v. Wade, in which Justice Harry Blackmun examined "the
history of abortion" in the opinion that struck down state laws
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (order for reargument); 347 U.S.
483 (1954); see Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. REv. 59 (1955).
7. 347 U.S. at 489,
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1988]
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that criminalized abortion. Justice Blackmun looked back to the
practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans for historical evi-
dence to support his conclusion that laws against abortion "are of
relatively recent vintage.""1 Blackmun's use of "social history"
was certainly not without precedent, but it provoked a barrage of
criticism that his evidence was selectively chosen to support a "re-
sult-oriented" outcome.12
My point in recgunting these cases and their differing uses of
historical evidence is to drive home the fact that constitutional ad-
judication is inescapably linked to history. No significant decision
of the Supreme Court can ignore or evade the historical context of
the case and of the conflict from which it stemmed, whether it be
an issue of intent, of precedent, or of social history. Given this
fact, how can we assess the process of historical review in cases
the Supreme Court has decided without access to the full histori-
cal record? The Japanese American internment cases provide a
good contemporary basis for such an assessment.
II. MILITARY NECESSITY OR RACISM?
Two dates place temporal brackets around the single event that
has most powerfully affected the community of Americans of Jap-
anese ancestry. The first is December 7, 1941, the day on which
Japan attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. When
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress the following day
for a declaration of war against Japan, he characterized the at-
tack as a "day of infamy." The second date is February 19, 1942,
the day on which President Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066, which authorized the Secretary of War or designated mili-
tary officials to exclude "any or all persons" from specified mili-
tary zones.13 Over the next several months, Lt. General John L.
DeWitt, who headed the Western Defense Command on the West
Coast, promulgated military curfew and exclusion orders that pre-
ceded the mass evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans
who resided in the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and
Arizona. 4 Confined in concentration camps that the government
called "relocation centers," members of this ethnic minority spent
an average of 900 days behind barbed wire fences. The camp at
Tule Lake, California did not close its gates until June 1946, al-
II. 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
12. See e.g., Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159.
13. 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942); see P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1983).
14. P. IRONS, supra note 13, at 68-74.
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most a year after Japan surrendered.
Among the entire Japanese American population, only three
young men faced the-risk of imprisonment and took their chal-
lenges to the military curfew and exclusion orders to the Supreme
Court. Each of these test-case defendants-Gordon Hirabayashi,
Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu-was convicted under Public
Law 503, enacted by Congress in March 1942 to enforce the or-
ders issued by General DeWitt under authority of Executive Or-
der 9066."5
Ruling on the curfew order in Hirabayashi v. United States in
June 1943, the Supreme Court held that the government's claim
of "military necessity" overrode the defendant's argument that the
order violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment as a
form of racial discrimination. Writing for a unanimous Court in
Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone bowed to the military
judgment that the Japanese American population included "dis-
loyal members" whose "number and strength could not be pre-
cisely and quickly ascertained." 6 Chief Justice Stone also ac-
cepted the government's claim that the "racial characteristics" of
this ethnic group, two-thirds of whom were native-born American
citizens, and the lack of "social intercourse between them and the
white population" cast doubt on their loyalty.1 7 "We cannot close
our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience," Stone wrote,
"that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an
invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a
different ancestry." '18 Stone provided no citation to the ethnic
groups he had in mind or the "experience" to which he referred.
The only invading enemy in American history had been the Brit-
ish, during the War of 1812, but the government had not interned
those of British ancestry, who then constituted the vast majority
of the American population.
The Supreme Court ruled only on the curfew order in Hiraba-
yashi, but the exclusion order returned to the Court in Korematsu
v. United States, which was decided in December 1944.19 Signifi-
cantly, by that time, the Allies seemed confident of ultimate vic-
tory over Germany and Japan and the Court seemed less confident
that the internment of Japanese Americans had been a necessary
policy. Nonetheless, the Court upheld Korematsu's conviction in a
six-three decision. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for the majority,
15. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173.
16. 320 U.S. 81, 99.
17. Id. at 98.
18. Id. at 101.
19. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
1988]
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accepted the government's claims that "the presence of an unas-
certained number of disloyal members" of the Japanese American
population and the impossibility of separating "the disloyal from
the loyal" had justified the mass evacuation of Japanese Ameri-
cans from the West Coast. Faced with bitter dissents from three
colleagues, Black responded defensively to charges that nothing
but racism had motivated General DeWitt. The exclusion order
would be clearly unconstitutional, Black confessed, "were this a
case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentra-
tion camp because of racial prejudice." However, Black denied
that Korematsu had been "excluded from the Military Area be-
cause of hostility to him or his race."2
Among the dissenters in Korematsu, Justices Frank Murphy
and Robert Jackson pointed to blatantly racist statements by Gen-
eral DeWitt and to the absence of any evidence of disloyal acts by
Japanese Americans. Murphy quoted DeWitt's claim to a con-
gressional committee in 1943 that there was "no way to determine
their loyalty." The official report of General DeWitt on the intern-
ment program, Murphy noted, included assertions that Japanese
Americans belonged to "an enemy race" whose "racial strains are
undiluted" even among those born and raised in the United
States.21 Justice Jackson case doubt on the claims in DeWitt's of-
ficial report that the exclusion orders had been prompted by evi-
dence of espionage on the part of Japanese Americans. "No evi-
dence whatever on that subject has been taken by this or any
other court," Jackson wrote. Despite "sharp controversy as to the
credibility of the DeWitt report," he continued, the Court "has no
choice but to accept General DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving
statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he did
was reasonable.22
A. Rescuing the Courts From a Judicial Disaster
The controversy over General DeWitt's official report, which
was withheld from the Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi case
and later submitted by the government in the Korematsu case,
assumed new relevance forty years after the Court's decisions.
However, it is significant that these decisions were almost immedi-
ately attacked by legal scholars as deficient in both law and fact.
As early as 1945, Eugene V. Rostow of Yale Law School de-
nounced the decisions as a judicial "disaster" and urged that "the
20. Id. at 223.
21. Id. at 236.
22. Id. at 245.
[Vol. 24
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basic issues should be presented to the supreme Court again, in an
effort to obtain a reversal of these war-time cases."23 Over the
next three decades, a stream of books and articles eroded the le-
gitimacy of the Supreme Court decisions with the acid drip of
scholarship.24
Of equal importance to the effort that Rostow urged in 1945
was the emergence in the 1970s of the "redress" movement
among Japanese Americans. Conscious of the struggle of black
Americans to demolish the legal barriers of American apartheid,
survivors of the internment camps and their children launched a
campaign to secure monetary compensation from Congress and
the courts for the violation of their constitutional rights. Respond-
ing to a concerted lobbying effort, in 1980 Congress established a
blue-ribbon panel called the Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians, charged with reviewing the "facts
and circumstances" that led to Executive Order 9066 and recom-
mending "appropriate remedies" for any wrongs imposed on the
Japanese Americans.25
During public hearings that were held in cities across the coun-
try in 1981, the Commission heard testimony, often tearful and
touching, from more than 750 witnesses. Most witnesses were
camp survivors, but the Commission also listened to several of the
governmental officials who had recommended and directed the in-
ternment program. One such witness, former Assistant Secretary
of War John J. McCloy, defended the internment as "retribution"
for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Another witness, former
Lt. Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, had drafted General DeWitt's offi-
cial internment report and had directed the mass evacuation. Re-
stating his wartime belief that the loyalty of Japanese Americans
was suspect, Bendetsen offered a succinct explanation: "Human
nature. '28
Reporting to Congress in December 1982, the Commission
unanimously concluded that the internment had imposed a "grave
injustice" on Japanese Americans. The Commission also found
that "Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military neces-
23. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945);
see also, Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme
Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945).
24. See e.g. M. GRODZINs, AMERICANS BETRAYED (1949); M. WEGLYN, YEARS OF
INFAMY (1976); R. DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERICANS
(1975).
25. COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PER-
SONAL JUSTICE DENIED 1 (1983). The Commission's members included former Senator
Edward W. Brooke, former Representative Robert F. Drinan, and former Justice Arthur J.
Goldberg.
26. P. IRONS. supra note 13, at 353, 355.
1988]
7
Irons: Clio on the Stand: The Promise and Perils of Historical Review
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
sity" but had resulted instead from "race prejudice, war hysteria
and a failure of political leadership. '27 The Commission based this
finding not only on oral testimony but on the review by its re-
search staff, of thousands of pages, of government files, secured
from the War Department, FBI, Office of Naval Intelligence, and
other agencies. This review convinced the Commission that Gen-
eral DeWitt's racism had affected the Supreme Court's decisions
in the wartime internment cases, particularly in Korematsu. The
Commission wrote in its report to Congress "[T]oday the decision
in Korematsu lies overruled in the court of history. ' 28
Even before the Commission filed its report, members of its re-
search staff and independent historians had uncovered documents
from government files that revealed a pattern of misconduct by
the government's lawyers in the internment cases. My own re-
search, begun in August 1981 for preparing a scholarly book on
the cases, led to Justice Department files that included charges by
government lawyers that Charles Fahy, the Solicitor General who
argued both the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases to the Su-
preme Court, had condoned the "suppression of evidence" in the
former case and had foisted "lies" on the Court in the latter.2 9
Additional research in the National Archives by Aiko Herzig-
Yoshinaga, the Commission's chief researcher, unearthed an ear-
lier version of General DeWitt's official report on the internment
program that had been ordered by John McCloy and Karl
Bendetsen to be burned and excised from government files. This
initial version included General DeWitt's claim that it was "im-
possible to establish the identity of the loyal and disloyal" among
the Japanese Americans, regardless of whether time had been
available to investigate the loyalty of individuals among this
group.30 The government's position in the wartime cases, accepted
without question by the Supreme Court in both the Hirabayashi
and Korematsu cases, had been that loyalty hearings were not
held because the identity of "disloyal" Japanese Americans "could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained."31 The "lack of time"
excuse, of course, was far different from the "impossibility" argu-
ment that General DeWitt first offered and that the Supreme
Court adopted.
Armed with the Justice Department files I had uncovered in
1981, I talked with Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred
27. See PERSONAL JusTICE DENIED, supra note 25, at 18.
28. Id. at 238.
29. P. IRoNs, supra note 13, at 202-06, 278-92.
30. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1453 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
31. 320 U.S. at 99; 323 U.S. at 218.
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8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss2/7
CLIO ON THE STAND
Korematsu, and broached with them the possibility of seeking ju-
dicial review of their cases. Despite the judicial principle of "final-
ity," federal law provided the vehicle of coram nobis, one of the
"ancient writs" that had been revived to allow the reopening of
criminal cases in which final judicial review had been exhausted. 2
The coram nobis writ was available only to defendants whose tri-
als had been contaminated by governmental misconduct that pro-
duced a "fundamental error" in procedure or a "manifest injus-
tice" in outcome.33 All three men agreed to my proposal, and I
then contacted lawyers-most of them Japanese American-in
San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle, the cities in which the cases
had been tried in 1942. Most of these lawyers were the children of
internment survivors, and they were eager to help in erasing the
stigma of shame their parents and grandparents had endured for
decades.
The legal teams we established in the three West Coast cities
spent months in reviewing documents, drafting pleadings, and or-
ganizing community support for the coram nobis effort. In Janu-
ary and February of 1983 we filed identical petitions in the origi-
nal trial courts, seeking vacation of the criminal convictions and
judicial findings that the curfew and exclusion orders had been
unconstitutional. Based entirely on government documents, the pe-
titions argued that the "suppression of evidence" and presentation
of "lies" to the Supreme Court in the Hirabayashi and Kore-
matsu cases constituted "fundamental error" that warranted va-
cation of those convictions, and of the United States v. Yasui 4
conviction as well. The petitions each included a lengthy historical
account of the factors that led to the internment decision,
designed to educate the judges and provide the necessary context
for cases that were four decades old.
The first petition to be decided was Korematsu, which came
before U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel in San Francisco.
The government filed a two-page response to the 150 page peti-
tion, characterizing the internment as an "unfortunate episode in
our nation's history" but also refusing to "disparage those persons
who made the decisions in question" or to admit any of the mis-
conduct charges in the petition. Although the government agreed
to vacation of Korematsu's conviction, it asked Judge Patel to dis-
miss his petition. 5 Because the government offered no substantive
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
33. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
34. 320 U.S. 115 (1943), see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
35. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984), (Govern-
ment's Response and Motion, Oct. 4, 1983).
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defense, Judge Patel decided the case on the basis of the petition
and oral argument at a hearing in October 1983, attended by
more than 300 persons, many of them internment survivors. Her
written opinion, issued in April 1984, cast scorn on the govern-
ment's response as "tantamount to a confession of error." '36 On the
basis of the documentary record in the petition, Judge Patel found
that "there is substantial support in the record that the govern-
ment deliberately omitted relevant information and provided mis-
leading information" to the courts, including the Supreme Court,
during trial and appeal of the case in the 1940s."' She concluded
with a stern admonition that the "judicial process is seriously im-
paired when the government's law enforcement officers violate
their ethical obligations to the court." 38 Stung by this rebuke to
their past colleagues, government lawyers filed a notice of appeal
but withdrew it at the last moment, allowing the decision to stand.
The government changed its tactics in the Yasui case, filing a
lengthy brief that attacked the petition on several jurisdictional
grounds: Yasui had waited too long to ask for relief and was
barred by the "laches" doctrine; no "cast or controversy" existed
because the government joined in asking for vacation of the con-
viction; and Yasui faced no continuing legal disabilities from his
conviction, required of coram nobis relief. District Judge Robert
Belloni, who conducted a brief hearing in January 1984, accepted
the government's arguments and displayed an obvious lack of in-
terest in historical review. In a two-page order, issued ten days
after the hearing, Judge Belloni noted that Yasui had sought a
judicial finding that the "the government knew about and with-
held evidence refuting military necessity" when his case was tried
in 1942. The judge wrote: "I decline to make such findings forty
years after the events took place . . . .Courts should not engage
in that kind of activity."39
Encouraged by this outcome, the government decided in the
Hirabayashi case to defend the wartime internment as a "ra-
tional" response by General DeWitt to fears of Japanese invasion
of the West Coast. At a pre-trial hearing in May 1984, before
district judge Donald S. Voorhees in Seattle, government lawyers
restated the jurisdictional arguments that Judge Belloni had ac-
cepted, to no avail. Judge Voorhees set the case for an evidentiary
hearing in June 1985, and both sides prepared for an exhaustive
historical review of the internment decision and the government's
36. Id. at 1413.
37. Id. at 1420.
38. Id.
39. Yasui v. United States,; (D. Ore.), (unreported order, Jan. 26, 1984).
[Vol. 24
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wartime behavior in the Hirabayashi case. During the two-week
hearing, governmental lawyers called a parade of former FBI and
military intelligence agents who testified that they had feared Jap-
anese attacks on the West Coast in the months after Pearl Har-
bor. William Hammond, a former Army officer, testified that "the
most likely friends of the enemy" were Japanese Americans, al-
though on cross-examination he could not identify a single act of
espionage or sabotage by members of this group. 0 Over the stren-
uous objections of government lawyers, I testified as a historian,
about my discovery in 1981 of the Justice Department documents
that formed the basis of the petition.
The government's star witness at the hearing was David D.
Lowman, a retired National Security Agency official and historian
of the so-called "Magic" cables, the Japanese diplomatic messages
that American intelligence had intercepted and decoded before
and during World War Two. During congressional testimony in
1984, Lowman claimed that the "Magic" cables "will clearly
show that President Roosevelt did have legitimate cause for con-
cern about the loyalty of ethnic Japanese on the West Coast in
1942." 4' On the witness stand in Seattle, Lowman testified that
these cables showed "espionage nets involving Japanese Ameri-
cans." One "espionage nugget" from the cables, he claimed, was a
report that gave numbers and dates of aircraft production in Los
Angeles, which he linked with another cable suggesting "second
generations" among the Japanese Americans in the aircraft facto-
ries as espionage agents. Confronted by Hirabayashi's lawyer with
a Los Angeles Times article that included the same data, Lowman
expanded his definition of espionage sources to include the "open
press." '42
Judge Voorhees allowed Lowman's testimony over the objec-
tions of Hirabayashi's lawyers, who claimed the "Magic" cables
had no relevance to the petition's misconduct charges. He also
permitted rebuttal testimony from a former Army intelligence of-
ficer, Col. John Herzig, who dismissed the cables as "raw" intelli-
gence that proved nothing more than unrealized Japanese hopes to
gain information from sympathetic Japanese Americans. In the
end, Judge Voorhees ignored the conflicting historical views of the
"Magic" cables, about which he admitted considerable prior
knowledge as a military history buff and World War Two naval
40. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 25, at 45.
41. JAPANESE-AMERICAN AND ALEUTIAN WARTIME RELOCATION, U.S. House of
Representatives, Commission on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations, Serial No. 90 (1984) 445.
42. Quoted from Hirabayashi trial transcript in Irons, Justice Delayed, 45, 46 (un-
published manuscript on file in offices of CAL. W.L. REV.)
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officer.
The crucial historical evidence in the case, Judge Voorhees con-
cluded, was the War Department's suppression of the initial ver-
sion of General DeWitt's official internment report. In this report
General DeWitt stated flatly that it was "impossible" to establish
the loyalty of Japanese Americans, "not that there was insufficient
time" to conduct loyalty hearings.43 The statement flatly contra-
dicted the government's representations to the Supreme Court
that "lack of time" to conduct loyalty hearings had required the
mass evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans. In his
written opinion, Judge Voorhees found that the government's fail-
ure to disclose this version of General DeWitt's report to the Su-
preme Court in 1943 "was an error of the most fundamental char-
acter" and required vacating Hirabayashi's conviction for
violating the exclusion order."" Judge Voorhees also concluded
that the curfew order Hirabayashi had violated was a "relatively
mild" burden on his rights, and sustained the conviction on that
count. 5
Both sides filed appeals from Judge Voorhees' decision with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Circuit Judge Mary
M. Schroeder, writing for a unanimous panel in September 1987,
began with a broad historical review of the wartime internment
and the Supreme Court decision that upheld the military orders.
"The Hirabayashi and Korematsu decisions have never occupied
an honored place in our history," she wrote. "In the ensuing four
and a half decades, journalists and researchers have stocked li-
brary shelves with studies of the cases and surrounding events.
These materials document historical judgments that the convic-
tions were unjust. '46 Among the historical accounts cited by
Judge Schroeder were my book on the internment cases and ear-
lier works by Roger Daniels, Morton Grodzins, and Michi Weg-
lyn.47 Significantly, Judge Schroeder noted that Hirabayashi had
filed his petition "to make the judgments of the courts conform to
the judgments of history."
Ruling on the substance of Hirabayashi's misconduct charges,
the Court of Appeals concluded from the documentary record that
"General DeWitt was a racist" and that the government had
withheld "the true basis for General DeWitt's orders" from the
Supreme Court in 1943. 41 This misconduct meant that "the Su-
43. 627 F. Supp., 1452.
44. Id. at 1457.
45. Id. at 1457-58.
46. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 593, n.1.
48. Id. at 601-02.
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preme Court would probably have been profoundly and materially
affected if the Justice Department had advised it of the suppres-
sion of evidence" that established the racist basis of the wartime
orders.49 Because Hirabayashi's two convictions had been "tried
together, briefed together, and decided together" by the Supreme
Court, and because the government's misconduct affected both,
Judge Schroeder concluded Judge Voorhees had "erred in distin-
guishing between the validity of the curfew and exclusion convic-
tions." The appellate panel thus reversed the curfew conviction
and cleared the last record in the wartime cases.50
From my perspective as a lawyer for the defendants in the Jap-
anese American internment cases, the "misconduct" charges,
backed by solid documentary evidence from the government's own
files, were obviously powerful. The government, although it moved
from contrition in Korematsu to truculence in Hirabayashi, never
disputed the authenticity of this historical evidence. Judge Patel
and Judge Voorhees, and the Ninth Circuit judges who heard the
Hirabayashi appeals, accepted the evidence without question. As
a historian, however, I doubt that all the historical argument in
the petitions was necessary to win these verdicts. The cases were
won, I think, because the verdict of the "Court of Public Opinion"
had already been rendered decades earlier. The devastating cri-
tique of the Supreme Court opinions by Eugene Rostow in 1945,
and the Supreme Court's rulings on civil rights cases in the 1950s
and 1960s, combined to make the vacation of the wartime convic-
tions virtually a foregone conclusion. This is not to say that the
historical excavation of the cases was unnecessary, because it pro-
vided essential evidence of governmental misconduct. This evi-
dence then gave sympathetic judges a plausible rationale for va-
cating convictions they had already decided were unjustified.
III. SCHOOLROOMS AND STORES: HISTORIANS ON THE STAND
A brief discussion of two recent cases in which historians took
the stand as expert witnesses will illuminate some of the problems
of advocacy versus objectivity. The first case arose from a suit
filed in 1981 by Ishmael Jaffree, a black lawyer and a parent in
Mobile, Alabama, against the governor and various state and local
officials. Jaffree sought to end the recitation of prayers in the pub-
lic schools his children attended. After Jaffree filed his suit, more
than 600 Mobile residents, many of them members of the city's
49. Id. at 603-04.
50. Id. at 608. The government filed a motion for an en banc rehearing of this deci-
sion on Nov. 12, 1987. The motion was denied on Dec. 24, 1987.
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largest Baptist church, asked District Judge W. Brevard Hand to
add them as interveners. Judge Hand granted their request and
allowed lawyers for the interveners to launch an attack on "secu-
lar humanism," which they claimed was a religion. If the courts
barred prayer in the schools, the interveners argued, textbooks
that promoted "secular humanism" should be barred as well. Dur-
ing the trial, in November 1982, the interveners called as an ex-
pert witness Dr. James P. McClellan, who earned both a doctorate
in political science and a law degree from the University of Vir-
ginia. The author of a book on Justice Joseph Story, McClellan
then served as Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee.5'
McClellan's role as an expert witness was to provide historical
ammunition for a frontal attack on two bastions of constitutional
law; first, the intent of the Framers of the first amendment to con-
struct a "wall of separation" between church and state; and sec-
ond, the intent of the Framers of the fourteenth amendment to
protect "liberty" against state encroachment. McClellan spent
most of a day on the stand, digging into historical documents from
the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates. In his
opinion, "those who participated in the framing and adoption of
the Bill of Rights clearly recognized that government could pro-
mote religion and not violate the establishment clause."52
McClellan claimed that "the fourteenth amendment was not in-
tended by its composers to apply the establishment clause to the
states" and accused the Supreme Court of "distortion" of the his-
torical record in applying the Bill of Rights to the states.53 Stating
that "I do not accept the doctrine of judicial supremacy," McClel-
lan challenged Judge Hand to defy the Supreme Court on the in-
corporation issue. Federal judges are "not required by oath to up-
hold the supremacy of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution," McClellan argued.54
Judge Hand accepted McClellan's challenge in his opinion,
holding that Alabama was free to establish a state religion under
the Constitution. Citing McClellan's testimony and writings as
"invaluable to the Court in this opinion," Judge Hand wrote that
McClellan's "mass of historical documentation" showed that "the
first amendment was never intended to be incorporated through
51. J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1971).
That McClellan is an advisor to and ally of Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) is worth men-
tion in this context.
52. Jaffree v. Board of School Commr's, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), trial
transcript at 541 (on file at Cal. W.L. Rev.).
53. Id. at 545, 550.
54. Id. at 589, 556.
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the fourteenth amendment to apply against the states. ' 55 Judge
Hand reviewed McClellan's historical claims, devoting some five
thousand words to this task, and placed his judicial imprimatur on
them: "This Court's independent review of the relevant historical
documents and its reading of the scholarly analysis convinces it
that the United States Supreme Court has erred in its reading of
history. '56
Not surprisingly, Judge Hand was firmly slapped by the Su-
preme Court, which rejected his "remarkable conclusion that the
Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establish-
ment of a state religion."57 Perhaps in response to McClellan's
prominent role in Judge Hand's opinion, Justice Stevens took
pains in writing for the Court to quote at length from Joseph
Story's writings on the meaning of the first amendment. Stevens
dismissed Story's views as archaic and pointedly cited the Court's
opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,5 8 which McClellan had
denounced in his trial testimony as having "no historical or legal
foundation."59 McClellan did find a Supreme Court ally, however,
in Justice Rehnquist, whose lengthy dissent in Jaffree quoted at
length from documents McClellan introduced into the trial record.
Denouncing the Everson decision as "unprincipled," Rehnquist
wrote that the "wall of separation" doctrine "has no basis in the
history of the amendment it seeks to interpret" and that states
should be able to pursue "secular ends" through "sectarian
means."
60
McClellan provided Judge Hand with highly partisan and ideo-
logical "intent history," and expressed views far from the histori-
cal mainstream. Nonetheless, his testimony and writings formed
the basis of Judge Hand's opinion and, more important, found a
champion on the Supreme Court in Justice Rehnquist. McClel-
lan's role as historical advocate may in time win more converts to
the "Church of Original Intent."
The second recent example of historians on the witness stand
illustrates the bitterness that can result when members of the
same scholarly community are cast into adversary roles, not only
in court but against each other. In 1979, the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against
the Sears, Roebuck company, charging a pattern of discrimination
against women in promotions to higher-paying commission sales
55. 554 F. Supp. at 1113.
56. Id. at 1128.
57. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48 (1985).
58. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
59. See trial transcript, supra note 52, at 582.
60. 472 U.S. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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jobs. Each side presented numerous expert witnesses at a trial in
June 1985 before U.S. District Judge John Nordberg in Chicago.
Among the witnesses were two leading women historians, Rosa-
lind Rosenberg of Barnard College and Alice Kessler-Harris of
Hofstra University.
Rosenberg agreed to testify for Sears after several historians,
including Carl Degler of Stanford, president of the American His-
torical Association, declined to appear. Although Rosenberg's
published work centered on feminist intellectual history, she cited
in her testimony more than fifty studies of women's work force
participation to buttress her claim that the substantial statistical
disparity between women and men employed by Sears in commis-
sion sales resulted not from discrimination but reflected differing
cultural values. "Women have goals and values other than realiz-
ing maximum economic gain," Rosenberg testified.6'
Kessler-Harris, whose scholarly work examines the history of
wage-earning women in the United States, responded for the
EEOC that women seek better and higher-paid jobs when choices
are available and not limited by discrimination. She provided ex-
amples from periods that ranged from 1850 to "Rosie the
Riveter" during World War Two.62 Even on the stand, the dispute
between the two historians took on a personal tone. Kessler-Harris
described Rosenberg as "ignorant of American history" and Ro-
senberg responded by charging serious discrepancies between
Kessler-Harris's published works and her testimony.63
Ruling for Sears in January 1986, Judge Nordberg issued a
lengthy opinion that praised Rosenberg's testimony and depre-
cated Kessler-Harris'. Characterizing Rosenberg as "a well-in-
formed witness who offered reasonable, well-supported opinions,"
the judge summarized her testimony as showing that, although
cultural differences "between men and women have diminished in
the past two decades, these differences still exist and may account
for different proportions of men and women in various jobs." Ro-
senberg "offered the more reasonable conclusion" that job dispari-
ties "could exist without discrimination by an employer," Judge
Nordberg concluded.64 The judge summarized Kessler-Harris's
testimony as describing "the general history of women in the work
force" and as offering "isolated examples of women who have
61. Weine, Women's History on Trial, THE NATION, Sept. 7, 1985, at 178. See also,
Jellison, History in the Courtroom: The Sears Case in Perspective, 9 PUBLIC HISTORIAN 9
(1987).
62. Id.
63. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1986, at B4.
64. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v. Sears Roebuck Co., 628 F. Supp.
1264, 1308, 1314-15 (N.D. II1. 1986).
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seized opportunities for greater income in nontraditional jobs
when they have arisen." Judge Nordberg wrote that "Dr. Kessler-
Harris insisted that numerical differences between men and
women in the work force can only be explained by sex discrimina-
tion by employers," but that she "offered no evidence to support
this bold assertion." 5
More important to this discussion than Judge Nordberg's choice
of historian is the public acrimony the trial provoked within the
historical profession. The New York Times, reporting a "Bitter
Feminist Debate," quoted one feminist as accusing Rosenberg of
"an immoral act" in testifying for Sears. Rosenberg conceded that
many fellow historians considered her "a kind of traitor to the
cause." A committee of female historians passed a resolution that
"as feminist scholars we have a responsibility not to allow our
scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling
for equity in our society." Some historians rallied to Rosenberg's
defense. Carl Degler, who called himself "cowardly" for declining
to appear for Sears, said that Rosenberg "agreed to look into an
issue, she examined it and she testified. History is a discipline in
which we try to uncover the truth as we understand it." Rosen-
berg "did the right thing" in testifying for Sears, Degler con-
cluded.6 But the profession remains polarized over the issues
raised by historians who take sides in court.
IV. SCHOLARSHIP AND ADVOCACY: CAN THEY COEXIST?
My own experience as historian and lawyer leaves me troubled
about the fuzzy line between scholarship as myth and scholarship
as advocacy. I firmly believe that the concept of "value-free"
scholarship is a myth and that historical "neutrality" is a chimera.
Historians bring their values, politics, and prejudices to their
work, particulary in areas of scholarship that are inherently con-
flictual. We do not demand neutrality of those who study the Hol-
ocaust or the history of slavery. All that historians can demand of
each other is that all the available evidence be examined and dealt
with openly and fairly.
Lawyers, however, are bound by the dictates of the adversary
system to a different set of values. The interests of the client are
paramount, and evidence is weighed for partisan advantage. The
lawyer searching for historical evidence to bolster a brief, Paul
Murphy noted, "knows that his job is to find those materials
which will best serve to persuade the judges to rule favorably in
65. Id. at 1314.
66. See N.Y. Times, supra note 63, at BI and B4.
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the immediate case. That he may choose his evidence from only
one side, or in such a way to partially distort the record, will
neither cause him qualms nor greatly distress the judge. 67
What we need to recognize and acknowledge, is that scholar-
ship is a form of advocacy. The best history aims not only to edu-
cate but to engage the reader in issues of importance and concern.
History has its code of professional responsibility, just as law does,
and the "Court of Public Opinion" is a tribunal that is as power-
ful as a court of law. Historians should not fear to take the wit-
ness stand, as long as they understand the limitations of historical
review.
67. Murphy, supra note 4, at 77.
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